, ' forces, TJW, and strategic weapons. t>. TacLicala. There is a simif.Leant short fa 11 in the conna tirility of our current TIP// stoclcnil* mix and its enploymnnt doctrine.
There has been a trend in th-Inat tiiree years to reduce the nunber of TMW ator^e Irn.n l.ior.G and consolidate thum at fov/er ultes, c. The psychological environment in '/entern fiocicty nuts ;:ATG at a disadvantogo in nuclegj? warfare. .«ght have the affect that the ". . »decounle» frc-, U>0 Kurocean ""dee. TOa "c n caeahili.ty, rnuulting in the denial of the "strategic nuclear aabrella". Thu.
thro option "eakene the credibility of the U.S. cctnitacnt to K "r""e and the deterrence of the »hole AUiancc. Finally, some key r e co:;,menrtmon S for ti^c im ^i-antaT,ion of thn nrincinles mentioned above:
1. Renewed effort to improve the comnand and control nyytene mi release procedures i« absolutely essential in order to optimize • the TNW element in the deterrence equation.
2. New TMV syateins incorporating the latest technoloßy should realace the cun-ent stockpile as soon as nossiblo.
3. The number of mi storage locations should not be further reduced.
Any deficiencies in these sites re^rdin,-facilities and security should be improved to necessary stand rds as soon PS possible.. " ffii^ S^iSS.
